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LIABILITY OF MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS FOR




I. HISTORY OF LIABILITY OF HOSPITALS1
Traditionally, hospitals were immune from suit under the doctrine of
charitable immunity.2 They were immune because they were charitable
organizations and provided care to the community. The "public and pri-
vate donations that supported the ... hospital constituted a trust fund
which could not be diverted."'3 TWo reasons were usually advanced to
support the rule of nonliability of a charitable hospital for the negligence
of its physicians and nurses in the treatment of patients.4 First, "[o]ne
who seeks and accepts charity must be deemed to have waived any right
to damages for injuries suffered through the negligence of his benefac-
tor's servants."'5 Second, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not ap-
ply because medical professionals, "even though employed by the
hospital, . . . were ... independent contractors rather than employees
because of [their] skill ... and the [hospital's] lack of control ... over
their work."6
* A.B., 1950 Harvard University; J.D., 1966, John Marshall Law School; Professor of
Law, John Marshall Law School.
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1. In the interest of brevity and convenience I will use the word "hospital"
throughout this article as a generic word including all institutional health care providers,
such as nursing and retirement homes, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), and
preferred provider organizations (PPOs).
2. Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hosp., 109 F. 294, 295 (1st Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 183 U.S. 695 (1901); Evans v. Lawrence & Mem. Associated Hosp., 50 A.2d 443, 444
(Conn. 1946).
3. Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 5 (N.Y. 1957).
4. Id.
5. Id. This basis was questionable because, as the court noted, the rule also included
paying patients and private profit-making hospitals. Id. at 5-6.
6. Id. at 6. This basis was also questionable because, as the Bing court pointed out,
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The protection of charitable immunity for hospitals began to disappear
in the middle of this century. As the New York Court of Appeals stated
in Bing v. Thunig in 1957, "[p]resent-day hospitals ... do far more than
furnish facilities for treatment."8 They employ professionals and a vari-
ety of others and "charge patients for medical care and treatment."9
Those who avail themselves of the facilities of a hospital look to the hos-
pital for treatment, and do not expect hospital employees to act on their
own.10 The court concluded that the rule of nonliability for hospitals was
"out of tune with the life about us ... [and] should be discarded."11
With the demise of charitable immunity for hospitals, liability could be
imposed on the basis of either respondeat superior (vicarious, indirect lia-
bility) or "corporate negligence" (direct liability). Liability based on re-
spondeat superior makes a hospital liable for the negligent acts. of its
agents/servants/employees acting within the scope of their employment.' 2
The "corporate negligence" basis for liability is that the hospital owes a
duty of care to its patients in the selection and supervision of both em-
ployees and independent contractors who provide medical treatment in
the hospital.' 3
The traditional justification for imposing vicarious liability on employ-
ers was that the employers had the right to control the method by which
the work was done, and should therefore ensure that the work was being
done carefully and properly.' 4 The corollary of this was that one who
employed an "independent contractor," as to whom the employer exer-
cised control only with regard to the result to be achieved and not the
respondeat superior was generally applied to such highly skilled employees "as airplane
pilots, locomotive engineers, [and] chemists." Id.
7. 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 9. While the court was undoubtedly giving proper recognition to changes in
medical practice and in societal attitudes, it is quite likely that the court was also motivated
by the increasing desire to find a "deeper pocket" from which to compensate those injured
by medical malpractice. G. Keith Phoenix & Anne L. Schlueter, Hospital Liability for the
Acts of Independent Contractors: The Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J.
875, 877 n.18 (1986).
12. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at
501 (5th ed. 1984).
13. See generally Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972)
(hospital is liable for negligence if it allows physician staff privileges when it knows or
should know physician is incompetent); Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp.,
211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
14. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 500.
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method of achieving it, would not be vicariously liable for the negligent
acts of the independent contractor.15 Because physicians exercise profes-
sional skills and discretion, and are usually not subject to any control by
hospital administrators as to their methods, they were generally held to
be independent contractors for whose negligent acts the hospital incurred
no vicarious liability.' 6
II. APPARENT AGENCY
During the second half of the twentieth Century dramatic changes have
occurred in the health care industry. What once was impossible or at
least miraculous has become commonplace' and almost mundane. Soci-
ety's attitude toward the health care industry has changed concurrently,
and the increased emphasis on "consumerism' 17 has led to increased de-
mands by patients for extraordinary, if not perfect, results from the per-
formance of medical professionals. In order to reduce their potential
liability for negligent treatment, many hospitals have entered into con-
tracts with non-employee physicians to supply some services to patients
that had previously been supplied by salaried employees of the hospital. 8
The departments where this has most commonly taken place are radiol-
ogy, pathology, clinical laboratories, and emergency room.' 9
Most of these hospital-physician contracts expressly state that the phy-
sician is an independent contractor, and in fact he2" usually is, since he
does not receive a salary and the hospital has no right to control the
method of providing his professional services. Despite the actuality of the
relationship, many courts in recent years have held hospitals liable for the
negligence of non-salaried physicians where a patient would reasonably
15. Id. at 509.
16. See Runyan v. Goodrum, 228 S.W. 397, 400 (Ark. 1921) (applying independent
status to X-ray specialist hired by physicians and surgeons); see also William C. Anderson,
III & Marilee Clausing, The Expansion of Hospital Liability in Illinois: The Use and Abuse
of Apparent Agency, 19 Loy. U. L.J. 1197, 1205-06 (1988).
17. "Consumerism" is encouraged by Ralph Nader and others.
18. Reducing potential liability is not the only reason, though it is perhaps the most
important one. Other reasons include reduction of administrative expenses, tax and finan-
cial advantages for the physicians, and the desire for increased professional control by the
physicians.
19. H. Ward Classen, Hospital Liability for Independent Contractors: Where Do We
Go From Here?, 40 ARK. L. REv. 469, 471 n.7 (1987).
20. When the gender for a personal pronoun could be either male or female, I use the
masculine pronoun generically, due to habit and my masculine personal orientation. By
doing so I avoid the rather awkward "he or she" and the grammatically incorrect "they." I
trust that female authors will balance the scales on the other side.
1994]
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believe that the physician was subject to the control of the hospital, and
the patient relied on such an appearance created by the hospital.2 These
courts are applying the long-established theory of apparent (or ostensi-
ble) authority, sometimes called agency by estoppel.22
The elements which most courts have required are:
1) the patient must reasonably believe that the nonemployee
physician is operating under the hospital's authority; 2) this
mistaken belief must have been generated by the hospital's act
or omission; and 3) the patient must have relied upon this rep-
resentation. If these elements are satisfied, the hospital is es-
topped from denying that the physician was its agent.23
Courts that apply the theory of ostensible agency to the hospital situation
recognize that patients frequently enter a hospital to receive care and
treatment from the hospital as an institution, and often do not know or
seek to know the identity or status of the medical professionals who will
supply that treatment.
Most courts that have considered this issue in recent years have held
"that independent contractor status of a particular treating physician is
not a bar to the hospital's liability for malpractice. '24 There are still
some, however, which continue to focus on the lack of control of hospital
over physician, and believe that the "independent relationship ... mili-
tates strongly against extension of a hospital's vicarious liability to physi-
cians who are not actual agents or employees of the hospital.
'25
21. Northern Trust Co. v. Saint Francis Hosp., 522 N.E.2d 699, 704 (I11. App. Ct. 1988).
22. As I will discuss in Part III infra, apparent agency and agency by estoppel are not
identical. Apparent or ostensible agency does not require a causal relationship between
the principal's conduct and the third party's reliance, and may not even require any reli-
ance. For there to be agency by estoppel, the third party must not only rely on the appear-
ance created by the principal but must also change his position to his detriment.
23. Claire G. Combs, Hospital Vicarious Liability for the Negligence of Independent
Contractors and Staff Physicians: Criticisms of Ostensible Agency Doctrine in Ohio, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 711, 714-15 (1987).
24. Martell v. Saint Charles Hosp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 350 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (citing cases
from 16 jurisdictions standing for the cited proposition).
25. Gilbert v. Frank, 599 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Iil. App. Ct. 1992). See also Hale v.
Sheikholeslam, 724 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (5th Cir. 1984); Banks v. Saint Mary's Hosp. &
Medical Ctr., 558 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983); Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843
(N.D. Ga. 1981); Badeaux v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 364 So. 2d 1348, 1351 (La. Ct.
App. 1978); Rucker v. High Point Mem. Hosp., 202 S.E.2d 610, 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974),
affd, 206 S.E.2d 196 (N.C. 1974); Berarducci v. Rhode Island Hosp., 459 A.2d 963, 964
(R.I. 1983).
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III. AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL: RELIANCE ON WHAT?
A. Patient Would Have Refused Treatment
Courts that apply estoppel in the traditional way require that the plain-
tiff plead and prove that, had he known that the physician treating him
was an independent contractor and not an agent or employee of the hos-
pital, he would have refused treatment by the physician and/or sought
treatment elsewhere.26 As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in Albain v.
Flower Hospital,27 under a strict view of agency by estoppel, "the ques-
tion is whether the plaintiff relied on the ostensible agency relationship,
not whether the plaintiff relied on the reputation of the hospital."28 The
court further pointed out that patients usually rely on the reputation of
the hospital and the presumed skills of its physicians, rather than their
employment status.29 This is especially true in emergency situations,
where there is no opportunity for informed choice or "shopping around,"
and the choice of hospital and physicians is often not even made by the
patient himself.3" In jurisdictions using this approach, the hospital will
not be held vicariously liable unless there is evidence that the patient
would have refused care and treatment by the physician if the patient had
known the physician was not an employee of the hospital.3
There are several serious flaws in the use of this approach to agency by
estoppel. In most cases patients neither know nor care whether physi-
cians providing medical services in a hospital are employees or independ-
ent contractors. It would be a rare case if a patient actually refused
treatment by a physician because of his employment status. In fact, some
patients probably know that in most hospitals today the radiologists, an-
esthesiologists, pathologists, emergency room physicians, and probably
others are independent contractors. These patients would thus be barred
from claiming reliance on any appearance of an employer-employee
relationship.32
26. Sztorc v. Northwest Hosp., 496 N.E.2d 1200, 1202 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (considering
whether plaintiff would have acted differently if she'd known radiologists were independ-
ent contractors); Gasbarra v. Saint James Hosp., 406 N.E.2d 544, 555 (Il1. App. Ct. 1979)
(plaintiff may have relied on appearance of emergency room doctors being agents of hospi-
tal, but it did not appear that she would have taken any other action had she been in-
formed that emergency room doctors were not employees of hospital).
27. 553 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1990).
28. Id. at 1049-50.
29. Id. at 1050 n.12.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 1050.
32. Martell v. Saint Charles Hosp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 342, 351 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
19941
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It is well known among attorneys who practice in the medical malprac-
tice field that a plaintiff who has been well prepared for a deposition or
trial will "routinely testify ... that had [he] known a certain physician was
not the agent or employee of the defendant hospital, [he] would have
gone elsewhere for [his] care."33 While this testimony may be believed in
some cases and result in vicarious liability for the hospital defendant, the
credibility of such testimony should be seriously doubted. The patient
needed treatment. He went to the particular hospital either because his
personal physician sent him there for tests or treatment, or because it was
an emergency. If he had refused treatment by a physician because that
physician was an independent contractor, where would he have gone? It
is highly probable that a physician providing the same services at any
other hospital in the vicinity would also be an independent contractor.34
In jurisdictions applying this strict test for agency by estoppel, the hos-
pital will avoid vicarious liability in all cases except those few where the
former patient is a very well prepared and convincing liar. Use of this
test simply ignores the realities of the usual patient-physician-hospital re-
lationships in the contemporary world of health care.
B. Patient Relied on the Hospital's Reputation
Most courts that hold hospitals vicariously liable for the negligence of
physicians, who are in fact independent contractors but who appear to
the patient to be agents or employees of the hospital, do not require any
action or inaction by the patient in reliance on the apparent employment
status. Unless the hospital informs the patient of the absence of an em-
ployer-employee relationship with certain physicians, or the patient
otherwise knows that there is no such relationship,3 5 the patient may rea-
sonably assume that all physicians providing treatment in the hospital are
under the supervision and control of the hospital.36 Except for care and
treatment provided by a patient's personal physician, or by a surgeon or
specialist as to whom the patient has made a specific choice, 7 most pa-
33. Anderson & Clausing, supra note 16, at 1226.
34. Id. at 1226-27.
35. Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp, 843, 853 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
36. One can hardly imagine a hospital announcing that some or all of its physicians are
completely independent contractors, and that it does not supervise or take responsibility
for their performance in any way! Gamble v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 438, 442 (N.D.
Ohio 1986).
37. See, e.g., Weldon v. Seminole Mun. Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Okla. 1985). In
such case, the hospital is merely the situs of treatment by a personally selected physician.
The patient does not look to the hospital to provide the treatment.
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tients consider themselves to be patients of the hospital itself. They rely
on the hospital to select and supervise competent physicians to provide
every medical service the patient needs.38
In their advertising, public relations, fund-raising campaigns and the
like, hospitals hold themselves out as highly qualified and trustworthy
providers of a wide range of medical care. Patients who use hospital fa-
cilities assume "that the hospital exerts some measure of control over the
medical activities taking place there., 39 "It would be absurd to require
... a patient to be familiar with the law of respondeat superior and so to
inquire of each person who treated him whether he is an employee of the
hospital or an independent contractor."'
Except for those patients who have a pre-existing physician-patient re-
lationship, almost all patients enter the hospital through the emergency
room. They seek treatment from the hospital itself, as, an institution.4
Even those patients who enter the hospital to be treated by their personal
physician or a chosen specialist will presumably receive some medical
services from physicians whose names they will not know until they re-
ceive the bill.42
IV. WHY REQUIRE RELIANCE AT ALL?
If reliance by the patient on the appearance of an employer-employee
relationship between hospital and physician is required, there will be a
high percentage of cases in which the hospital will not be held vicariously
liable. When the services of medical personnel such as radiologists, anes-
thesiologists, and pathologists are used, the patient usually never sees the
physician at all. In the emergency room, patients are often unconscious
or under great stress when they arrive, and are unlikely to have any real
awareness of how or by whom they are being treated.43 Some courts
have responded in recent years by applying the "enterprise theory" of
vicarious liability to hospitals.
38. See, e.g., Whitlow v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 536 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987).
39. Gamble v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 438, 442 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
40. Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
41. Grewe v. Mount Clemens Gen. Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 429,435 (Mich. 1978); see gen-
erally, Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255,256-57 (Ky. 1985) (citing several cases
applying ostensible agency to emergency room physicians).
42. See, e.g., Stratso v. Song, 477 N.E.2d 1176, 1185-86 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984)(anesthesiologist).
43. See, e.g., Walker v. Winchester Mem. Hosp., 585 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (W.D. Va.
1984); Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985).
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Under the "enterprise theory," the risk of loss for injuries caused by
those acting on behalf of and for the benefit of the "enterprise" is allo-
cated to the "enterprise" itself. The enterprise treats these costs as part
of the cost of doing business, and is in the best position to distribute the
costs as part of its charges to its customers."
In Hardy v. Brantley, 5 the court applied the following approach to the
vicarious liability of a hospital:
Hospitals hold themselves out to the public as offering and ren-
dering quality health care services.... If they do their job well,
the hospital succeeds in its chosen mission, profiting financially
and otherwise from the quality of emergency care so delivered.
On such facts, anomaly would attend the hospital's escape from
liability where the quality of care so delivered was below mini-
mally acceptable standards. All of this is surely so whether the
high or low quality of emergency care is delivered by physician,
nurse, paramedic or any other person engaged by the hospital. '
In Jackson v. Power,47 the Supreme Court of Alaska held that an acute
care hospital "has a non-delegable duty to provide non-negligent physi-
cian care in its emergency room. ,48 Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme
Court held, in Paintsville Hospital Corp. v. Rose,49 that "the operation of
a hospital emergency room open to the public, where the public comes
expecting medical care to be provided through normal operating proce-
dures within the hospital, falls within the limits for application of the prin-
ciples of ostensible agency and apparent authority."50 And, much to the
dismay of the three dissenting judges, the majority opinion did not discuss
reliance at all. In the view of the dissent, "[tihe majority opinion, ...
without expressly saying so,.. . abolishes reliance upon the alleged osten-
sible agency as a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of liability upon
the ostensible principal."',5
44. Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843, 849-50 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (citing WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 69, at 459 (4th ed. 1971) and FOWLER V. HARPER &
FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.1 (1956)).
45. 471 So. 2d 358 (Miss. 1985).
46. Id. at 371.
47. 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987).
48. Id. at 1385. But see Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1048 (Ohio 1990)
(expressly rejecting the existence of any "nondelegable duty to assure the absence of negli-
gence in the medical care provided by private independent physicians granted staff privi-
leges by the hospital").
49. 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985).
50. Id. at 258.
51. Id. at 260 (Vance, J., dissenting).
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V. HOSPITAL CAN BE INDEMNIFIED BY PHYSICIAN
It is unrealistic to believe that hospitals can effectively inform their pa-
tients of the independent contractor status of most of the physicians ren-
dering services to patients in the hospital.5 2 Many patients, because of
their presently impaired physical or mental condition and their limited
ability to comprehend and understand sophisticated legal concepts, can-
not be deemed to have made an informed choice to look only to the phy-
sician for compensation in the event of negligent treatment.53 It is,
therefore, entirely reasonable to put the hospital in the position of guar-
antor by imposing upon the hospital vicarious liability for the negligence
of any physician providing services in the hospital if that physician ap-
pears to the public to be an agent or employee subject to some control or
supervision by the hospital.
Nonemployee physicians providing medical services in the hospital
have a contractual relationship with the hospital. As such, the parties are
free to make any agreement they wish between themselves.54 In addition
to its common law right to indemnification when held vicariously liable,
the hospital can provide in its nonemployee physician contracts that the
physician will defend, indemnify and hold the hospital harmless from all
claims and liabilities resulting from the physician's negligence.55 To be
sure that this right of indemnification will effectively shield the hospital
from financial loss, the hospital should require that every physician have
professional liability insurance with appropriately high limits,56 and that
the hospital be included as an additional insured.57
VI. CONCLUSION
A hospital should not be able to use contractual arrangements to insu-
late itself from liability for acts of medical malpractice committed upon
its premises by physicians who appear to be agents or employees of the
hospital.5" Most hospitals present themselves to the public as "full ser-
52. For what I consider to be rather naive and unrealistic suggestions of steps a hospi-
tal could take to inform its patients, see Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 11, at 890-91.
53. Classen, supra note 19, at 498.
54. Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 369 (Miss. 1985).
55. Id. at 362, 369; Arthur v. Saint Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 446 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979).
56. Hardy, 471 So. 2d at 362.
57. In some cases it might be more effective for the hospital to obtain insurance for
itself and all its physicians on a group basis. The cost of this insurance could then be
allocated to the physician as part of the overall contractual arrangement.
58. See Hannola v. City of Lakewood, 426 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
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vice health care facilit[ies] ... committed to excellence."59 They seldom
attempt to inform patients of the employment status of their physicians,
nor is it likely they could do so effectively.' Because hospitals invite the
public to rely on their competence in the provision of health care, it
seems eminently fair to allow the public alsoto rely on the hospital as a
guarantor of compensation if something goes wrong. The hospital will be
entitled to indemnification from a negligent physician, and the ultimate
economic burden will fall, as it should, on the person who was at fault. In
this way, users of medical services will be better protected against the
losses resulting from medical malpractice, with minimal ultimate expense
to the hospital."' The hospital can readily reduce or eliminate its expo-
sure to claims by carefully selecting and supervising all physicians who
provide services in the hospital, and requiring that they are financially
responsible.
59. Phoenix & Schlueter, supra note 11, at 887.
60. Id.; see also supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
61. The only ultimate cost to the hospital would be the occasional case where the
physician's insurance and personal assets were insufficient to pay a negligence claim.
